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Abstract  
  This paper looked at the on the ongoing debate on the use of public export credit 
programs and their impact on US exports.  Our results indicate that cost saving is 
significant beneficial to the importing countries as a result of the export credit programs.  
There is also an increase in US exports as a result of the US export credit programs.  
However, there is a reduction in cost savings to the importing countries when the length 
of repayment of export credit is 180 days.  Thus, the more restrictive terms and 
conditions of officially supported export credits which the WTO is trying to discipline 




  Ever since Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture was agreed upon at the 
Uruguay Round, the use of officially supported export credits for financing and 
stimulating export sales of agricultural products has been an on-going negotiation at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  The Article states that, “The WTO member countries 
undertake the development of internationally agreed upon disciplines to govern the 
provision of export credits, export credit guarantees, or insurance programmes and, after 
agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit guarantees, or 
insurance programmes only in conformity therewith”, (WTO, 1995).  Its implementation 
has not yet been finalized as the WTO disciplinary rulings even after the conclusion of 
the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China, in December 2005.  Prior to 
the sixth Conference, on August 1, 2004, the WTO General Council reached a decision   3
on the framework to continue with the “multilateral” trade negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA).  The framework refers to the “July Package”.  Its key 
components concerning agricultural trade include: (i) the future elimination of all forms 
of export subsidies and better disciplines on export credits, state trading enterprises, and 
food aid, (ii) introducing new commitments to discipline trade distorting domestic farm 
subsidies and promoting deeper cuts in countries with higher domestic farm subsidies, 
and (iii) committing WTO member countries to pursue “progressity” in tariff reductions 
with a view to achieving substantial improvements in market access while allowing for 
flexibility in treatment of sensitive products (WTO, 2004). 
  Surprisingly without final agreements regarding agricultural trade, in April 2004, 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO ruled in favor of Brazil, and the Appellate 
Body upheld the finding by the WTO Panel that: 
“the United States export credit guarantee programmes at issue—GSM 102, GSM 103, 
and SCGP—constitute a per se export subsidies within the meaning of item (j) of the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of the SMC Agreement,” (WTO, 2005). 
 
However, the introduction of the Article 3 of the GATT 1994 legal text states that, 
“Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, within the measuring of the Article 
1 the Sub-Articles 3.1 (a) and 3.1 (b) list the subsidies that are subjected to be 
prohibited.”  This seems to indicate that agricultural products are exempt from item (j) of 
the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) Agreement.  Item (j) states that export credit facilities provided by 
governments or other institutions on their behalf should be at premium rates adequate to 
cover long-term operating costs and losses such as sunk costs (WTO, 1994).  This 
agreement was reached by integrating the principle guidelines, which were originally   4
agreed on by the member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  The agreement was intended to be applied only for manufactured 
goods (OECD, 1998). 
  It is unclear whether in the future the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO will 
apply the SMC Agreement to discipline the use of officially supported export credits for 
other agricultural commodities as it did to the United States (US) cotton exports.  Also, 
the European Union (EU) has advocated that they are willing to reduce their direct export 
subsidies if the US and other countries are willing to reduce their export credits, state 
trading enterprises, and food aid.  Additionally, the July Framework gives further 
instruction to the WTO Committee on Agriculture that disciplines of the use of officially 
supported export credits should build upon the “Harbinson Text”.  With respect to 
disciplining the use of officially supported export credits, the Text emphasizes in 
establishing consensual agreements on terms and conditions of officially supported 
export credits.  They include maximum repayment terms, a minimum cash payment, 
payment of interest rates, minimum interest rates, repayment of principal, premiums in 
respect of coverage of risks under export insurance, reinsurance and export credit 
guarantees, foreign exchange risk, and period of validity of export financing.  For 
instance, to reflect the duration-life of agricultural products the maximum repayment 
period of an export credit for most agricultural product has been negotiated for a 
maximum period not exceeding 180 days (WTO, 2003).  If the agreement is finalized, the 
General Service Management (GSM) programs of the US such as GSM 102 and GSM 
103 will need to reduce their maximum required repayment period from 3 years to six 
months for the GSM 102 and from 7 years to six months for the GSM 103.   5
  The objective of this paper is to examine how the terms and conditions of 
officially supported export credits are likely to affect the import demands of importing 
countries.  According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (1976), besides providing domestic benefits, export credits also provide 
significant benefits to the importing countries by enabling them to import necessary 
goods and services even though they do not have hard currencies at hand to pay fully in 
cash.  Abraham (1990) shows that export credits such as subsidized buyer credit and 
official development assistance provide favorable financing conditions to importers, 
which induce the importers to demand more of the export good.  Alternatively, many 
studies pointed out that an export credit could generate an additionality to importing 
countries, which would result in increasing volume of trade.  At the same time the world 
price is not necessary depressed as in the case of a direct export subsidy (Baron, 1983; 
Smith and Ballanger; 1989, Diersen, 1995; OECD, 2000, Young et al., 2001).  The 
problem we address is economically significant since if the additionality exists, then the 
more restrictive terms and conditions of officially supported export credits which the 
WTO is trying to discipline based on their implicitly subsidized components will have 
more adverse impact on the importing countries.  To meet its objective, the paper is 
organized as follows.  Section 1 provides a brief background on the functioning of export 
credit programs and the ongoing negotiations at the WTO. Section 2 provides the 
derivation of the theoretical model.  Section 3 provides a brief description of data sources 
used and the empirical model.  Section 4 presents the empirical results.  Lastly, section 5 
concludes. 
   6
Background 
  Following the lead of the British government that established its export credit 
programs in 1919, many developed, developing, and other countries established their 
export credit programs with similar objectives
1.  These were: (i) to promote the growth of 
exports by providing insurance to exporters, (ii) to offer financing for exporters’ foreign 
clients, and (iii) to make guarantees to exporters’ commercial banks in obtaining their 
export financing.  They considered their export credit programs to be useful policy 
instruments and as means of encouraging their producers to expand and diversify exports.  
These export credit programs were thought necessary to improve their trade balance, 
diversify their exports beyond primary products, increase their foreign exchange reserves, 
and reduce their national unemployment (UNCTAD, 1976; Mutharika, 1976).  They also 
felt that their export credits could contribute at least three direct benefits to their 
countries: (i) protect exporters from potential losses due to non-payment risks, (ii) serve 
as collateral for exporters in securing bank financing from the private sector, and (iii) 
reduce the cost of collecting information on the credit standing of foreign markets. 
The importance of export credits in the trade of manufactured and agricultural goods has 
been apparent, especially during periods of economic and financial crises in importing 
countries, such as the oil shock in the 1970’s, debt crises in the 1980’s, and the financial 
bubble in the 1990’s.  For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended 
that the debt crisis of least-developed and developing countries could be alleviated if the 
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) of developed countries resumed their export credits to 
                                                 
1 The first group of followers was developed countries, which included France, Spain, Italy, Japan, the 
United States, and Canada.  After the oil shock of 1970, developing and other countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Columbia, Czechoslovakia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Poland, the Republic of Korea, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia also developed their export credit insurance 
programs (UNCTAD, 1976).   7
these countries.  The export credits would provide vital short-term liquidity and facilitate 
the imports of capital goods that were necessary to renew their economic growth, since 
following their debt crisis, most foreign commercial banks and private lending 
institutions were reluctant to lend to them (Brau et al., 1986).  By 1998, the IMF 
estimated that the total export credit exposure to the developing countries and economies 
in transition by the ECAs of developed countries had reached US $550 billion 
(Gianturco, 2001).  Between 1995 and 1998, the total value of export credits provided on 
agricultural trade by fifteen OECD countries increased from US $5.5 to $7.9 billion 
(OECD, 2000). 
However, the flow of export credits to least-developed and developing countries 
is not free from controversy, and the use of export credits has become a highly politicized 
issue in trade policy (Abraham and Dewit, 2000; and Leathers, 2001).  Prior to 
multilateral agreements among member countries of the OECD to establish benchmarks 
on terms and conditions offered through export credits, various ECAs could aggressively 
use their export credits to underbid their competitors by offering lower interest rates, 
longer, and more favorable conditions on loan credits, tied and/or untied aid
2, and mixed 
credits
3 to importing countries.  For example, the European ECAs offered lower interest 
rates through their export credits to importers than the rates charged by private markets.  
In contrast, the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) of the United States (U.S.) charged 
interest rates close to market rates but offered longer terms for repayment, which the 
                                                 
2 Tied aid is aid which is in effect tied to the procurement of goods and/or services from the donor country 
and a limited number of other countries.  Untied aid is aid whose proceeds are fully and freely available for 
procurement of goods and/or services from all OECD countries and substantially from non-OECD 
countries (OECD, 1998). 
3 A mixed credit is a mixture of the direct loan credit and grant element (or the subsidy on the loan) as 
foreign aid to produce concessional financing packages having a grant element between official export 
credits and official development assistance (Fleisig and Hill, 1984).   8
European ECAs and private markets would not offer.  In addition, to match the 
consessional export financing granted by other exporting countries and attempting to 
persuade them to eliminate such practices, the U.S. Congress gave a mandate to and 
equipped with sufficient funds for the Eximbank to match the consessional export 
financing granted by other nations (Baron, 1983).  Due to aggressive practices of 
underbidding and/or matching export financing offers among the ECAs from different 
countries with the financial supports from their governments, export credits have become 
known as officially supported export credits
4. 
Consequently, the export credit races from underbidding practices became 
expensive to finance and resulted in inefficient use of financial resources for those 
countries that used such strategy to increase their exports.  In addition, the export credit 
races gave significant power to importing countries to bargain for more favorable import 
contracts among different exporting countries (Fleigsig and Hill, 1984; Fitzgerald and 
Monson, 1988; and Rodriguez, 1987).  They further argue that the economic costs are 
substantially greater than the economic benefits of providing export credits.  They also 
assert that to reduce unemployment or improve the balance of payments, governments 
can implement fiscal and/or monetary policies, instead of using export credits to promote 
exports. 
  Unlike other studies, Baron (1983) points out that the economic costs may be 
greater than the economic benefits under matching the consessional export financing if 
only the consessional export financing is permanent so that importing countries could 
permanently withdraw resources from the sector that benefited from foreign consessional 
                                                 
4 According to the OECD (1998), an officially supported export credit program is a program with the 
involvement of government such as: (i) directly offering credit, (ii) offering interest rate subsidies, (iii) 
assuming risk for private loans, and (iv) offering supported insurance to private lenders.   9
export financing to other sectors.  He also contends that the provisions of export credit 
insurance and guarantee programs are economically justified due to non-payment risks 
associated with importing countries and if importing countries face imperfect capital 
markets.  From financial strategy, not many private financial institutions from foreign 
countries would be willing to lend or buy government bonds of those countries face 
political turmoil or reschedule their heavy debt with the Paris Club
5.  As mentioned 
above, during debt crisis in the 1980s most foreign commercial banks and private lending 
institutions were reluctant to lend to least-developed and developing countries. 
The principle guidelines on the use of export credits for manufactured goods 
resulted from a gradual and long series of negotiations of the member countries of the 
OECD (known as Arrangement) from 1978 to 1997.  It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to provide historical negotiations and consensus agreements of the Arrangement
6.  Thus, 
the remainder of this section will only highlight the benchmarks of the Arrangement, 
which were consensually agreed to prevent export credit races in export ofe manufactured 
goods and which are relevant to the current negotiation for agricultural exports. 
The benchmarks included credit terms and conditions of export credits.  The 
credit terms refer to interest rates, length of the repayment terms, down payments, and 
risk premium rates.  The conditions of export credits refer to the financial 
                                                 
5 The Paris Club is an informal group of creditor governments that meet on a regular basis in Paris to 
reschedule bilateral debts.  Creditors meet with a debtor country in order to reschedule its debts as part of 
international support provided to a country that is experiencing debt-servicing difficulties and is pursuing 
an adjustment program supported by the IMF (Ross and Harmsen, 2001). 
6 OECD (1998) summarizes historical events of negotiations and consensually agreed principle guidelines 
reached by the Arrangement from 1978 to 1997.   10
interdependence of export credits with other programs such as large-scale projects
7, tied 
and/or untied aids, and mixed credits. 
To set benchmarks on the credit terms and conditions of export credits, the 
Arrangement classified importing countries into three classes: rich, intermediate, and 
poor based on their per capita GDP
8.  First, the benchmark for minimum interest rates 
was set based on (i) the income class of an importing country, (ii) length of the 
repayment period, and (iii) market rates reflecting credit worthiness/economic conditions 
of the importing country
9.  Second, the benchmark for maximum repayment period was 
set based on (i) the income class of an importing country, and (ii) financial involvement 
such as credit lending or investment lending.  Third, the benchmark for minimum down 
payments was based on the income class of an importing country.  Fourth, the benchmark 
for minimum risk premium rates was set based on (i) the risk assessment of an importing 
country, (ii) cost of covering long-term operating costs and losses, and (iii) quality and 
percentage of risk coverage provided.  Fifth, the Arrangement set the benchmark for 
offering aid credits as follows.  Prior to a face-to-face consultation to match any aid credit 
                                                 
7 A large–scale project refers to a project involving mining operations, steel mills, industrial plants, and 
public utility plants, which requires a large scale of financing with a long term maturity. 
8 These countries are classified based on having their gross national product per capita at a level at which 
the World Bank would or would not grant a loan longer than 17 years to them.  For example, for a rich 
country, the World Bank would not grant a loan longer than 17 years to it since it is considered to be 
creditworthy enough to attract commercial credits (OECD, 1998). 
9 The Arrangement agreed to use the Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CIRRs) as the minimum 
interest rates to respond to the movement of interest rates determined by the market and to prevent an 
interest rate subsidy that results from the divergent range between high- and low-interest-rate countries.  
The CIRRs were established according to five principles: (i) to represent final commercial lending interest 
rates in the domestic market of the currency concerned; (ii) to correspond closely to the rate for first-class 
domestic borrowers; (iii) to be based, where appropriate, on the funding cost of fixed interest-rate finance 
over a period of no less than five years; (iv) to not distort domestic competitive conditions; and (v) to 
correspond closely to a rate available to first-class foreign borrowers.   11
offered among the OECD participants, all aid credits must contain less than a 35% grant 
element of the total export credit value
10. 
  By 1997, the key benchmarks for the credit terms and conditions of export credits 
were consensually agreed by the OECD participants in establishing the principle 
guidelines for the use of export credits on manufactured exports.  As mentioned above, 
the principle guidelines of the Arrangement have been recognized and integrated into the 
multilateral trading system of the WTO, which are codified within Article 3 of the 
GATT-1994 Agreement on the SCM Agreement which prohibit many forms of export 
subsidization.  Two specific disciplinary rulings with regard to the provisions of risk 
premium are —item (j) and interest rates—item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies in Annex I. 
Starting in 1994, the OECD Participants undertook a work program with the goal 
of arriving at an understanding on disciplines for officially supported export credits on 
agricultural products, which would be in conformity with Article 10.2 of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Agriculture.  Currently, there is no report indicating whether the 
Arrangement of the OECD has reached a consensus agreement on the guidelines for the 
use of export credits for agricultural products.  On July 9, 2002, a progress report by the 
Chairman of the Arrangement was released which stated that the OECD Participants had 
not reached consensus agreements upon the content of the report (OECD, 2002). 
With respect to establishing benchmarks on the use of export credits for 
agricultural exports, the following elements were defined and reported within the 
                                                 
10 It was agreed that each Participant must notify other Participants about its offering aid credit to a 
particular importing country, and that the other Participants then have the right to match it in a face-to face 
consultation.  However, the matching is agreed not to be in any form of underbidding.  By 1991, the 
Arrangement agreed to prohibit the use export credits in any form of tied or partially tied aid to richer 
developing countries.   12
progress report.  First, the repayment term was defined as the period between the starting 
point of credit and the contractual date of the final payment.  It was proposed that the 
maximum length of repayment of export credits used for most agricultural products 
should not exceed 180 days
11.  Second, the starting point of an export credit was defined 
as a date no later than the weighted mean date or actual date of arrival of the agricultural 
goods in the recipient country for a contract under which shipments are made in any 
consecutive six-month period.  Third, for any export credit contract, the duration of 
which is one year or longer, the repayment of principal is defined as the principal sum of 
the export credit
12.  Fourth, for any export credit contract which has a duration of one 
year or longer, the payment of interest should not be capitalized during the repayment 
period and should be paid with a frequency of no less than every six months. Further, the  
first payment should be made no later than six months from the starting point of the 
export credit.  Fifth, any purchaser of exported agricultural products is required to make a 
minimum cash payment of 15% of the total value of the export contract from his/her own 
resources at or before the starting point of credit.  Sixth, in terms of risk sharing, any case 
in which no cash payment is imposed, an OECD member should not cover 100% of the 
export value of a transaction.  Seventh, if the repayment term is two years or greater, the 
minimum interest rate should be determined based on the CIRR system 
13.  Finally,  when 
the repayment term exceeds 180 days, credit terms and conditions for an individual 
                                                 
11 In some exceptions, such as those for breeding cattle, cotton, agricultural vegetable reproduction 
materials, cereals and cereal preparations, and oilseeds and oilseed products, their repayment can exceed 
180 days but cannot be longer than the durable life of the products. 
12 It should be repaid in equal and regular installments no less frequent than every six months, and the first 
installment should be made no later than six months after the starting point of the export credit. 
13 The minimum interest rate with the repayment term less than two years will be developed later by the 
OECD Participants.   13
export credit or line of export credits should not be fixed for a period exceeding six 
months . 
The member countries of the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture (CA) that are also 
the member countries of the OECD were waiting and hoping for the Arrangement to 
reach a consensus agreement on the use of officially supported export credits for 
agricultural products.  The outcome of the agreement could then be integrated into the 
WTO system for implementing Article 10.2.  Meanwhile, the non-member countries of 
the OECD expressed their concerns.  They contended that the guidelines on the use of 
officially supported export credits for agricultural products should be negotiated and 
established under the WTO’s negotiation forum.  Their main reason for this view is that 
the guidelines agreed on by the Arrangement are unlikely to reflect their concerns.  In 
addition, many developing countries who are net food importers expressed their concerns 
in a fear of high import prices if export credits were to be faced out (WTO, 2000, 2001a, 
and 2001b).  In spite of different concerns, the Harbinson Text in which the July 
Framework instructs the WTO CA to build on to discipline the use of officially supported 
export credits outlines similar credit terms and conditions which the Arrangement of the 
OECD drafted described above.  Thus, when and how Article 10.2 will be finally 
implemented  hinges on an on-going-negotiation process of the WTO’s CA. 
Theoretical Model 
  As mentioned above, the credit terms and conditions on the use of government-
supported export credits for agricultural goods are still under negotiation by the WTO 
and the OECD.  One question that needs to be addressed is how these credit terms and 
conditions of export credit programs can be effectively assessed as subsidized elements in   14
terms of affecting import demands and/or export supplies of agricultural goods.  There 
are many studies which have developed several approaches to calculate the subsidy 
values of export credit programs.  The present value approach was developed and applied 
in several studies such as Baricello and Vercarmen (1994), Baron (1983), Hyberg et al. 
(1995), Raymand (1992), Skully (1992), and Wilson and Yang (1996).  A cost-benefit 
analysis was conducted by Fleig and Hill (1984).  These studies calculated subsidy values 
that are associated with government-supported export credits such as subsidized interest 
rates and provided long period repayments.  They have considered them as a cost savings 
to an importer, which could be interpreted as a price discount on imports.  Empirically, 
the OECD (2000) applied the present value approach to calculate the subsidy values of 
export credit programs for agricultural goods as a series of price discounts, in terms of 
their impact on the import demand side. They concluded that the subsidized elements of 
officially supported export credits of fifteen member countries of the OEDC are small. 
  Alternatively, Diersen (1995) applies the present value approach to calculate the 
subsidy values of export credit programs and empirically treats it as an additionality.  His 
theoretical approach is based on the two-period intertemporal consumption decision and 
relies on the assumption that officially supported export credits increases loan supply 
which in turn relaxes budget constraint of importing countries.  Paarlberg (1997) and 
Rude (2005) also apply the two-period intertemporal consumption decision framework.  
This approach seems to capture the interest term of officially supported export credits.  
As described above an officially supported export credit can be offered in multiple 
combinations of various terms and conditions.  Moreover, the general result of the two-
period intertemporal consumption decision framework implies that, consumption will   15
increase in the first period if it is possible to borrow from a future period provided the 
consumer has a large discount rate. 
  Our study contends that if the secondary benefits arise from an export credit 
program in terms of a cost saving to the importing country, the decision on how much to 
import is likely influenced by the budget constraint of the importing country.  Moreover, 
we presume that the cost saving may be viewed as an additional income to the importing 
country.  Alternatively, our study supposes that the secondary benefits of an export credit 
program, received by the importing country, can be represented as a fixed discount rate 
‘d’ on its import payment.  We use ‘d’ as a general measure to capture the secondary 
benefits arising from many of the potential policy parameters of export credit programs 
such as (i) down payments, (ii) annual subsidized or guaranteed interests with the export 
credits, (iii) annual discount rates (or market rates without export credits), and (iv) 
payments per year, length of repayments, grace periods, and fee rate which is expressed 
as a percent of value. 
  We consider one possibility such that ‘d’ is the difference of two present value 
streams.  The first present value stream ( 1 PV ) is calculated under the scenario of which 
there is no subsidy element being offered to the importing country such as when the 
importing borrowing in its home country.  The second present value stream ( 2 PV ) is 
calculated under the scenario in of which there is a subsidy element being offered to the 
importing country through an export credit program.  Thus, the fixed discount rate ‘d’ can 
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(i)  Domestic Demands of the Importing Country in the Absence of Secondary 
           Benefits from an Export Credit Program 
 
 
(a) The Marshallian Demands with the Absence of Export Credits 
  For simplicity, we assume that there is one tradable and homogeneous good, 
namely good 1.  Regarding good 2, we assume the importing country produces it for 
domestic consumption.  Alternatively, good 2 can be assumed that trade is not possible or 
there is no benefit from trading it.  However, the two goods are substitutable in 
consumption.  Suppose that the preferences of the representative consumer can be 
represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function such as, 
12 12 (2) ( , ) Uc c c c
α β =  
It is assumed that  1 0 < <α ,  1 0 < < β , and  1 = + β α .  With fixed income I , suppose 
that the consumer faces the prices of good 1 and good 2 such that  1 p  and  2 p  
respectively.  From the perspective of the consumer in the importing country, if he/she 
does not receive secondary benefits from an export credit program of the exporting 
country, his/her budget constraint is not affected.  Then, the utility maximization of the 
consumer can be expressed as: 
12 12 12 &
11 22
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Forming the Lagrange function, deriving the first order conditions, and solving them, the 
Marshallian demands of goods 1 and 2 can be obtained as: 

















(b) The Marshallian Demands with the Presence of Export Credits 
  In contrast, if the consumer in the importing country receives secondary benefits 
from an export credit program, his/her budget constraint is likely to be affected due to the 
cost saving on the import payment.  From above discussion, this study presumes that the 
consumer views his/her cost saving on the import payment as being discounted.  Thus, 
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Note that ‘d’ refers to the fixed discount rate discussed above
14.  The range of the subsidy 
element is assumed to take on the value of  1 0 < ≤ d .  If  0 = d , this implies that there is 
no discount on the import payments; thus, the budget constraint formulated in equation 
(6) is just the same as the budget constraint in equation (3b).  If  1 = d , then there is a full 
discount such as for aid relief, which implies that consumption of good 1 is not an 
optimization choice for the consumer in the importing country.  Thus, this study assumes 
that  1 < d . 
  By applying a similar utility maximization procedure, , the Marshallian demands 
of goods 1 and 2 can be obtained as: 
                                                 




















  From the above result, it can be seen that ‘d’ does not appear as an argument of 
the domestic demand of the importing country for good 2.  This shows that the demand of 
good 2 is not affected by the presence of secondary benefits from of an export credit. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the inverse import demands of the importing country for good 
1 derived from the CD utility function in the absence and presence of secondary benefits 
while holding income of the importing country fixed, and assumed that there is no 








1 f f f I C p p =  represent the 
inverse import demands of good 1 which are derived by respectively by inverting the 
(direct) import demands defined in equation 4 and 7.  They express the price of good 1 as 
a function of quantity consumed, and income of the importing country.  Figure 1 shows 
that the inverse import demand curve of the importing country shifts to the right if it 
receives the secondary benefit relative to the scenario where the importing country 
receives no secondary benefits.  This arises because for any demand quantity, the price 
differential between the two scenarios receiving and not receiving secondary benefits can 
be derived as, 
10
11 (9) /(1 ) ff SF p p d == −  
Note that the result presented in Figure 1 resembles the graphical result of a direct 
consumption subsidy presented by Houck (1986) (see Figure 9.2 on p89-90).  In his 
graphical analysis, he supposes that the importing country directly offers the consumption   19
subsidy on a particular good to its consumers whether the good is domestically produced 
or imported while this study supposes that the exporting country offers the fixed discount 
on the import to the representative consumer in the importing country
15. 
Figure 4.3: A Shifted Inverse Demand of the Importing Country in the Presence of 

















                                                                                                                                            
 
(ii) Domestic Supply Function of an Importing country 
  With the assumption of certainty setting for payment and full information about 
productivity and both input and output prices, we apply the standard profit maximization 
                                                 
15 Houck (1986) also illustrates that if the importing country directly offers the consumption subsidy on a 
particular good to its importers instead of offering to its consumers, its domestic demand would not shift 
out.  By construction, this study also expects that if the secondary benefits from an export credit program 
are offered to an importer, instead of offering to the representative consumer in the importing country, the 



































problem derive the short-run supply function of a competitive firm in the exporting 
country.  Suppose that the firm produces a single output, namely good y, by using two 
inputs  1 x  and  2 x , and suppose that its short-run variable cost of the firm is defined as
16: 
2 (10) ( ) Cy B y =  
 Additionally,  let  G  be the short run fixed cost of the firm.  The profit 
maximization of the firm can be formulated as: 
{ } ( 1 1 ) () () y Max y Py C y G Π=− − 
Where 
2 () Cy B y =  and P is the output price. 
Applying standard profit maximization approach and applying Hotelling’s lemma, the 











(iii) The Import Demands of the Importing Country in the Absence and Presence 
of Secondary Benefits from an Export Credit Program 
 
  As a price taker, the absence or presence of secondary benefits from an export 
credit program offered by the exporting country to the consumer in the importing country 
does not affect the production cost.  Thus, when trade opens up, in the absence or 
presence of secondary benefits from an export credit program, the short-run supply 
function of the firm in the importing country is the same as its short-run supply prior to 
trade recorded in equation 11. 
                                                 
16 Rienstra-Munnicha (2004) applied two-input-model of cost minimization to derive the short-run variable 
cost of the firm as 
2 () Cy B y = .  Where  1/( ) γ αβ = +  and both α  and β  are the parameters of the 
production function.  He further explained that it is reasonable to assume that  2 γ = .   21
(a) The Import Demands of the Importing Country in the Absence of Secondary 
           Benefits from an Export Credit Program 
 
 If  good  Y is allowed to trade between the two countries, the excess demand of 
good Y of the importing country is the difference between its domestic demand (4) and 
supply (12) for any price level P which lies below its autarky prices 
a P .  The import 
demand can be derived as: 
1 (13)



















Note that the introduction of the additional superscript ‘N ’ refers to the absence of 
secondary benefits from an export credit program offered by the exporting country. 
(b) The Import Demands of the Importing Country in the Presence of Secondary 
           Benefits from an Export Credit Program 
 
  With the assumption that the tradable good Y is homogeneous, in the sense that it 
is impossible to distinguish its source, its market in the importing country is satisfied 
from domestic and imported quantities.  If a secondary benefit from an export credit 
program is offered to the consumer in the importing country, his/her budget constraint is 
altered from the case of not receiving any secondary benefits (see equation 6).  It is a 
difficult task to separate the quantities being discounted on the payment from those which 
are produced domestically.  However, from the perspective of the consumer in the 
importing country, his/her consumption of domestic or imported good Y depends on   22
where he/she can purchase the tradable good Y at a cheaper price due to cost savings.  
This is captured by the effective price with the cost savings recorded in equation (9). 
  When trade opens up, both the consumer and firm in the importing country face 
the same effective price.  Therefore, this study derives the import demands of the 
importing country in the presence of secondary benefits from an export credit program by 
replacing price of the import demands expressed in equations (13) by the effective price 
expressed in equation (9).  The import demands of the importing country in the presence 
of secondary benefits from an export credit program are recorded in equation 14 below.  
Note that the introduction of the superscript ‘S ’ refers to the presence of secondary 
benefits from an export credit program offered to the importing country. 












  Holding all other exogenous variables and parameters fixed, the two scenarios of 
the importing country’s inverse import demand can be presented graphically as in Figure 
1.  It is seen that in the presence of secondary benefits from an export credit program, the 
inverse import demand of the importing country vertically shifts to the right of the import 
demand where there are no secondary benefits.  As cited earlier, the results presented 
here resemble the graphical result of a direct consumption subsidy presented by Houck 
(1986). 
Data Sources: 
In choosing the importing countries in our data sample, we consider seven importing 
countries which received GSM 102 export credits from the US over a consistent period. 
Most of these countries are either not granted or approved export credit for wheat imports   23
under the GSM 103 and SCGP programs, we limit our focus to the impact of GSM 102 
export credit programs on US wheat import demand in seven importing countries: Egypt, 
Korea, Mexico, Algeria , Turkey, Jordon and Indonesia. Data on the quantity and value 
of wheat imported by these countries from the Unites States and the World were obtained 
from the United Nations’ Comtrade database.   Quantity and value of wheat imports by 
the importing countries from the rest of the world (ROW) were calculated as the 
difference between total wheat imports from the world and US. Import price of US (US 
price) wheat was calculated by dividing value of wheat imports from the US by quantity. 
Import price of wheat imported from the world (world price) was calculated in a similar 
manner. The import price of wheat from the ROW was calculated as the difference 
between world price and the US price.  Data on the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
importing countries, consumer price index and interest rates of the importing countries, 
and the exchange rate between the United States and the importing countries were 
obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary 
Fund.  Domestic production of wheat in the importing countries were obtained from the 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations’ (FAO). Finally data on the 
amount of export credits under the GSM-102 program and the specified repayment 
periods (which were later converted into cost savings-see appendix 1 for details) given by 
the United States to the importing countries were collected from the Foreign Agricultural 
Trade of the United States (FATUS) various  fiscal year end issues. All data used in this 
study are annual data for the time period 1994-2004.  All prices, import value of wheat, 
GDP and cost savings were converted into real values by dividing by the corresponding 
CPI of the importing countries.    24
Empirical Model: 
Prior empirical works on the impact of export credit programs on US export include Koo 
and Karemera (1991) and Diersen (1995).
17 Other empirical studies analyze import 
demand models on the impact of US non-price export promotion programs on US exports 
(Le et al (1998); Halliburton and Henneberry (1995)).
18 Our empirical import demand 
model is based on a general consumer demand model with the inclusion of demand 
shifters such as exchange rates and a variable of cost savings resulting from export credit 
to test our concept of additionality.  Thus an importing countries’ demand for wheat is a 
function of own price, price of substitutes, income and domestic supply. Thus our model 
is specified as follows: 
) PVC , EX , DOM , GDP , Pc
P




i =                                                             (1)            
 
Common demand theory applied to import demand model states that imports of an 
importing country i from a exporter j (
j
i M ) are a function of the price of the exporting 
country (Pj) and price of its competitors (Pc) .
19 Exchange rates (
j
i EX ) determine the price 
                                                 
17 Koo and Karemera (1991) used a similar approach to analyze the impact of export credit programs. 
Using a gravity model approach, they incorporate dummy variables based on in the periods in which export 
credit under GSM-102 was offered to capture the shift in the import demand.  On the other hand Diesren 
(1995) on the other hand  tested for additionality under the GSM-102 program using  an intertemporal 
consumption model and “loans” as choice variables . Our study differs from Diesren (1995) in that we 
include  the net present value of cost savings into the budget constraint  Empirically, we calculate the 
present value of cost savings based on semi-annual payment and use actual repayment period  while 
Diersen (1995) assumed single payment and fixed repayment period of 3 years. 
 
18 The estimated coefficient of the amount spent on non-price export promotion programs in these studies 
are interpreted as additionality, that is, additional imports due to the increased spending on these programs.  
 
19 See Lord, 1991 for details on application  of common demand theory to trade models. Ideally we should 
use the Canadian  price of wheat and  prices of other competetitors’ , which  compete directly with the US 
in the international wheat market as a substitute for US wheat. But due to lack of data we use the ROW 
price. Moreover as the US price and the ROW price move closely together we use a price ratio to avoid 
multicollinearity problems.   25
paid for imported goods. Thus, as long as a product has substitutability, importing 
countries can choose alternate sources to satisfy their import demand (Anderson and 
Garcia, 1989). Similarly, income (GDPi) positively influences the quantity demanded. As 
mentioned in the previous section export credit relaxes the budget constraint of the 
importers in the sense that they gain additional income due to cost savings. Thus in this 
sense they have more income and are likely to import more with increase in income. 
Therefore income is included in our model.  
 Finally, domestic production (DOMi) has a 
negative impact on demand in the importing countries provided wheat is a normal good. 
Finally in our theoretical model we incorporate a discount factor resulting from the 
present value of cost savings accrued from export credits (PVCi). In our empirical 
specification, we calculate the net present value of cost savings resulting from GSM 102 
export credit as a demand shifter. We use this variable to test our theory of additionality 
as a result of export credits. Based on equation (1) we specify our empirical model as 
follows: 
t i t i t i t i t i
t i ROW
t i US
t i e PVC DOM GDP EX
P
P
M , , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2
,
,
1 0 , ln ln ln ln ln ln + + + + + + = β β β β β β   (2) 
where  M is the value of imports of US wheat in real US dollars. The subscript i denotes 
the seven importing countries (i= Egypt, Korea, Mexico, Algeria, Turkey, Jordon and 
Indonesia) ,the subscript t represents the time period (t=1994-2004) while ln stands for 
the natural log of the variables. 
t , i ROW
t , i US
P
P
 is the price ratio of US wheat imports relative to ROW wheat import price. EX is 
the relative exchange rate between US and the importing countries. GDP is the real gross 
domestic of the importing country, which represents the income of the importing country   26
expressed in US dollars. DOM is the domestic production of the importing countries in 
metric tons while PVC is the present value of cost savings to the importing country from 
export credits. 
20 
Finally t , i e  is the error term which is assumed to independent and normally distributed.   
A similar model was used to estimate the impact of credit programs when the length of 
repayment is reduced to 180 days, the only difference being the PVC variable which was 
calculated using 180 days as the length of repayment and short term interest rate (less 
than a year). 
An increase in the price of US relative to the ROW would reduce the demand for 
US wheat. On the other hand, an increase in the price of the ROW wheat relative to the 
US will increase the demand for US wheat. The variable price ratio is therefore expected 
to be negative. An increase in the value of US dollar relative to the importing countries’ 
currency would increase the price paid for US wheat and thereby reduce the value of 
wheat imports from the US. Similarly, a depreciation in the value of the US dollar 
relative to the importing countries would make US wheat cheaper and increase the 
demand for US wheat. Thus the variable exchange rate (EX) is expected to be negative.  
As income of the importing countries increases they are likely to import more 
wheat from the US therefore the variable GDP is expected to be positive.  
As domestic production of wheat increases in the importing countries’ they are 
likely to import less wheat from the US and the variable DOM is expected to be negative. 
Finally the variable PVC for additionality is expected to be positive. As importing 
                                                 
20 See Appendix I for details on calculation of  PVC. 
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countries’ benefit from the increased present value of cost savings resulting from the 
GSM 102 export credits granted by the US, they are likely to import more wheat from the 
US. 
Estimation Method: 
Due to the limited availability of time span of availability of data on the GSM- 102 
export credits given by the US to the importing countries, we pool time-series and cross-
section data to increase the sample size of our data set. Several econometric problems 
were addressed before estimation. First we evaluated estimated the stationarity properties 
of the variables using an Im, Pesaran and Shin panel unit root test. Results of the test are 
reported in Table 1.
21  
The variables price ratio and domestic production were found to be stationary both under 
the presence of a constant and constant and trend at the one percent level. On the other 
hand, exchange rate, income and cost saving and cost saving were found to be stationary 
under the presence of a constant but non-stationary under the presence of a constant and a 
time trend at the 5 percent level (with the exception of exchange rate which was 
significant at the one percent level). Based on our results we can conclude that there is 
lack of sufficient evidence of non-stationary in the variables tested.  Next we address the 
potential endogeneity of the price ratio.  
The demand for US wheat by importing countries may influence the import price of 
wheat. Thus the value of US imports and price are jointly determined causing the price 
ratio to be correlated with the error term. Presence of an endogenous variable indicates 
                                                 
21   For additional literature on testing stationary properties of variables in panel data see Breitung and 
Meyer,1994; Im, Pesaran, and Shin ,2003; Pedroni,2004;Baltagi,2005.  Results of panel unit root test for 
model II are similar and not reported here to conserve space. These are available from the authors on 
request. 
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that instrumental variable (IV) techniques must be used for estimation. In order to justify 
the use of IV techniques we must show that endogenous variable satisfies the 
endogeneity test. To test the exogeneity of the price ratio variable, we use the Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993) test.
22 The null hyothesis of the test states that using the ordinary 
least squares estimator would ( OLS) that is, the OLS fixed effect model would result in 
consistent estimates and the presence of endogeneity among the regressors would not bias 
the OLS results. Rejection of the the null hypothesis indicates the need to use 
instrumental variable techniques.  We fail to reject the null hypothesis for both models, 
indicating that endogeinety of the price ratio variable is not a potential problem and the  
results from OLS fixed effects estimation would be consistent.  
Finally due to the panel nature of our data set we test for any evidence of serial 
correlation . We use the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data models 
correlation.
23  The null hypothesis of this test states that there is no serial correlation. 
Significance of the F-statistics indicates that there is presence of serial correlation. In 
both the models we fail to reject the null hypothesis indicating that serial correlation is 
not a problem.  
                                                 
22 This test is similar to to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) show that that 
this superior to the Hausman test in that we are always able to compute a test statistic. On the other hand, 
computation of a test statistic under the Hausman test is possible when the difference between estimated 
covariances matrices results in a positive definite matrix.Thus it is difficult to compute a reasonable test 
statistic using standard matrix inversion techniques. See Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) for details.  
 
23 
  Under this test the null hypothesis states that the residuals from the regression performed on first 
differenced variables should have an autocorrelation value of about -0.5.  That is when we regress lagged 
residuals on current residuals, the coefficient on the lagged residuals should be -0.5. Ducker (2003) show 
that this test performs well when the sample size is reasonable. See Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003) 
for more details. 
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One of the major problems with panel data is heterogeneity across panels. If the 
unobserved heterogeneity effects of the individual panels are correlated with the 
variables, a fixed-effect model is estimated.  
However, if the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the variables, there will 
be efficiency gains if we model the individual panel –effects as randomly distributed 
components of the error using a random-effect estimator (Baltagi, 1995).
24 We perform a 
Hausman specification test to test compare the estimates from the consistent fixed effects 
model to the estimates from the efficient random effects estimator. The null hypothesis is 
that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the model. If null hypothesis is rejected 
(individual effects are correlated), a random effect model produces biased estimators and 
a fixed effects model is preferred.  For both the models the Hausman test rejected the null 
hypothesis in favor of the fixed effects model. But, when we used the Bresusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects, we rejected the null hypothesis in 
favor of the random effects model.
25 However, due to the inconsistencies of the Hausman 
test, we decided to use the random effects model.
26 
 
                                                 
24The standard random effects estimator is that the weighted average of the fixed effect and between effect 
estimator. See Baltagi (1995) chapter 7 for details. 
 
25 We also test for random effects using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test.  The null 
hypothesis is that the variances across groups are zero. If the null hyothesis is not rejected, pooled OLS 
regression is appropriate. We reject the null hypothesis in favour of random effect model in both models. 
 
26 One of the more stronger assumptions of the Hausman test is that one of the estimators is efficient, that 
is, has minimum asymptotic variance. If this is violated, results are inconsistent. In our analysis, when we 
specified the random effects model as efficient (tested fixed vs random), we rejected the null hyothesis in 
favour of the fixed effect model in both models I and II. However, when we specified the fixed effects 
model as efficient (that is tested random vs fixed) we obtained a negative Chi-Square value in both the 
models. Though a negative Chi-Square value may be interpreted as allowing us to accept that the random 
effects model in favour of the fixed effects model. However, the results of the Hausman test are sensitive to 
specification of the regression model and need to interpreted with caution. Please see Greene (2003) for 
more details.   30
Empirical Results: 
Results of the estimated demand equations are reported in Table 1. All the variables had 
the expected signs in both the models. Domestic production was negative and significant 
in both the models at the one percent level indicating that as domestic production of 
wheat in the importing countries’ increases they are likely to import less wheat from the 
US. Exchange rate was negative and significant at the one percent level in both the 
models indicating that an appreciation of the US dollar relative to the importing countries 
currency decreases the amount of wheat imported from the US.  GDP was also significant 
at the five percent level in both the models indicating that an increase in importing 
countries’ income increases the demand for US wheat. More importantly cost savings 
from export credit was positive and significant at the 5 percent in both the models 
supporting our theory of additionality. In model I, where the length of repayment was 
more than 180 days, an increase in the present value of cost saving results in about a three 
percent increase in the value of US imports. Our impacts are smaller compared to Diersen 
(1995) who finds benefits from export credit programs result in a eight percent increase 
in the quantity imported from the US.
27 In model II where the length of repayment is 
reduced to 180 days as proposed under the new WTO guidelines, cost savings result in a 
2.5 percent increase in the value of US imports. Though the reduction in import value is 
less than one percent following reduction in terms of repayment, this is significant when 
we consider the overall value of wheat imports by the importing countries’ from the US. 
 
                                                 
27 The difference in results is due to the fact that our technique of calculating cost saving is different from 
Diersen(1995) as explained earlier. 
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Summary and Concluding Remarks 
  This paper looked at the on the ongoing debate on the use of public export credit 
programs and their impact on US exports. The principle guidelines for government-
supported export credits on manufactured goods were consensually agreed on by the 
Participants of the Arrangement after a long and gradual series of many negotiation 
rounds, from 1976 to 1997.  The guidelines of the Arrangement were integrated into the 
WTO Rulings to discipline the use of officially supported export credit programs on 
manufactured goods.  However, the integration guidelines do not apply in the case of 
export credits for agricultural goods, which has been the subject of negotiations after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture under 
Article 10.2.    We  developed  a  theoretical framework to analyze the additionality 
resulting from the use of export credit programs, particularly, the GSM 102 program of 
the US. We incorporate both the cost savings offered to the importing country as a result 
of export credits in our model. In our empirical model we test the concept of additionality 
using an import demand model.  Our results indicate that there are significant cost saving 
benefits to the importing countries as a result of the export credit programs. There is also 
an increase in US exports as a result of the export credit programs. Our results imply that 
an export credit program increases quantity exported due to the shifting of the import 
demand curve to the right. This contradicts other studies which claim that export credit 
causes a movement along the import demand curve and a shift in the excess supply curve 
to the right in order to increase quantity exported and lower the world price. However, 
there is a reduction in cost savings to the importing countries when the length of 
repayment of export credit is 180 days. Thus, the more restrictive terms and conditions of   32
officially supported export credits which the WTO is trying to discipline based on their 
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Table 1: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
1 
Variable  Constant  Constant and Trend 




Ratio of import prices between the 
United States and the Rest of the 
world (ROW) 
-10.047(0.000)*** -8.414(0.000)*** 
Exchange rate between importers 
and the United States 
-2.302 (0.011)***  1929(0.973) 
GDP of the importing countries -1.995(0.023)** 1.525(0936) 
Domestic production of Wheat in 
the importing countries  
-30.132(0.000)*** -23.222(0.000)*** 
Cost Saving of the importing 
countries 
-1.636(0.051)** -0.088(0.465) 
1Reported values include the test statistic and in parenthesis is the probability for the null hypothesis that 
the variable has unit root. 
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Table 2: Results of the Randon Effects (RE) Models  
Variable Description  Model  I-More 
than 180 days 
Model II-180 
days 
LPRAT  Ratio of import prices 
between the United 
States and the Rest of the 
world (ROW) 
-0.28  (0.30)  -0.27 (0.30) 
 
LEXRATE  Exchange rate between 
importers and the United 
States 
-0.86  (0.19)***  -0.85 (0.19)***
LGDP  GDP of the importing 
countries 
0.47 (0.20)**  0.45 (0.20)** 
LDOMPRD  Domestic production of 
Wheat in the importing 
countries  
-0.31 (0.86)***  -0.31 (0.08)***
LPVC  Cost Saving of the 
importing countries 
0.03 (0.031)**  0.025 (0.01)** 
Davidson-Mackinnon  












test- Fixed effect  model 
vs random effects model  
  ( ) 34 . 39 5
2 = χ  
p=0.00*** 
() 99 . 29 5
2 = χ  
p=0.00*** 
Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian Mutiplier 
test for random effects 
  ( ) 06 . 23 1
2 = χ  
p=0.00*** 
() 86 . 22 1
2 = χ  
p=0.00*** 
*** and ** indicate significance at the one and  five percent level respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are 
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Appendix I: Calculation of Present Value of Cost Savings 
 
We demonstrate the method utilised in calculating the present value of cost savings 
(PVCS) using an example where export credit is given by US to Egypt. In this example 
PVCS is calculated when the term of repayment is greater than 180 days. A similar 
approach was used to calculate PVCS  when the period of repayment is 180 days, except 
we use short term interest rate. 
 






































































EC PMT  
where ECUS is export credit given by US to Egypt,  US i is the interest rate in the US , n is 
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Step 3: Finding semi-annual payment (PMTEC) if borrowing in Egypt 
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EC PMT  
where ECEG is the export credit received by Egypt from the US,  EG i is the interest rate in 
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PMT FV  
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Step 6: Calculating the future value of cost savings (FVCS) from steps 1 and 4 
 
*
EG US FV FV FCSV − =  
 
 















FVCS PVCS  
 
Note: When we calculate present value of cost savings for 180 days, the term of 
repayment is one (n=1). All other formulas remain the same. 